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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
The instant case involves the divorce proceeding of Plaintiff! Appellant, Pedro Pelayo 
("Pedro"), and DefendantlRespondent Bertha Pelayo ("Bertha"). The Honorable Magistrate 
Judge Ryan Boyer presided over a three day trial that began February 26, 2010 and ended March 
12,2010. On May 18,2010 the Trial Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Judgement 
Regarding Divorce, Custody and Child Support ("Memorandum Decision"). Clerk's Record p. 
70. After denying post trial motions the Trial Court issued a Decree of Divorce on September 1, 
201 Clerk's Record p. 102. Notice of Appeal to the District Court was filed on July 29,2101, 
but the appeal was stayed pending the out come of an additional post trial motion. Clerk's Record 
p. 97. The additional post trial motion was denied so the District Court appeal then moved 
fonvard. Pedro appealed to District Court from the Memorandum Decision, Decree of 
Divorce and Denial of Post Trial Motions which included Pedro's Motion for New Trial and/or 
to Alter or Amend Judgement and Motion for Relief from Court Order. 
On January 23,2012 the District Court entered its Decision and Order On Appeal. 
Clerk's Record p. 191. Pedro prevailed on one of several issues that he appealed to the District 
Court. Pedro now appeals with respect to other issues on which he did not prevail. Thus, as set 
forth below Pedro appeals from the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision, Decree of Divorce and 
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denial of post trial motions and the District Court's Decision and Order on Appeal as to issues 
specified below. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW/CONCISE STATEMENT OF 
FACTS 
The parties were married in Mexico on May 7, 1984. Mag. Tran. p. 30 (99:20-25). 
parties had three children born of the marriage, however at the time of the divorce only one child 
was still a minor, namely, born  Mag. Tran. p. 9 (12:18-24). The 
parties spent the majority of their married living in or near Blackfoot, Idaho. Mag. p. 
30 (100:9-14). At the time of the divorce, the parties owned property on Bronco Road on the Fort 
Hall Indian Reservation and a house on Airport Road in the City of Blackfoot. Mag. Tran. 
p. 30 (100:15-25). The airport road house was purchased in 2005. Mag. Tran. p. 31 02:1-4). 
Pedro moved out of the Airport Road house 2009 about one month before filing the 
Divorce Complaint on June 18, 2009, through his attorney Stephen J. Blaser. Mag. Tran. p. 31 
(101 :8-20); Clerk's Record p. 10. On July 17,2009 Bertha filed a Verified Answer and 
Counterclaim through her attorney, Scott Axline. Clerk's Record p. 21. On July 24, 2009 Pedro 
answered the Counterclaim. Clerk's Record p. 38. Over the next few months the parties engaged 
in discovery and there were motions related thereto. 
Originally trial was scheduled on December 18,2009, but at the Pre-trial Status 
Conference held on November 23,2009 said trial was continued until February 26,2010. Before 
Page 2 of 43 
trial began on February 26, 201 0 the parties provided the Court with a Stipulation dated that 
same day which resolved the following issues: 
1. The parties would have joint legal custody of the one minor child and Bertha 
would have primary physical custody of said child. 
2. The parties primary residence located at 1302 E. Airport Road would be listed 
with a real estate agent and sold as soon as possible. Bertha could reside the 
home until it sells as long as it does not interfere with the sale. debt on 
home would be satisfied from the sale proceeds. Pedro would make the payments 
on the home until it sells, however, Pedro's agreement to make the payments 
would not prevent either party from making arguments relative to ultimate 
apportionment and/or credit on such payments. 
3. The parties also m\l1l land and personal property located at R3 Box 200 Fort Hall, 
Idaho, which would be awarded to Pedro and would be valued at $125,000. Pedro 
would pay Bertha for her one-half interest in Fort Hall property after the house 
on Airport Road sells. Pedro was to pay Bertha $62,5000 by giving Bertha 
share of the Airport Road proceeds and within six months Pedro would endeavor 
to get a loan to pay the remaining balance owed. 
The parties own property Mexico which the court was to value and then decide 
who would receive that property or how it would otherwise be divided. 
5. Each party received a vehicle. Bertha received 2001 Corolla while Pedro received 
a 1995 Suburban. 
6. The parties were to divide Pedro's retirement account at Edward Jones, through a 
QDRO. 
Mag. Tran. p. 6-7 (1 :25-p.7:1-17); Clerk's Record p. 41-45. 
After explaining the Stipulation, the Court and the parties agreed on the record, that the 
remaining issues were: 
1. The amount of child support; 
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2. The effective date of child support; 
3. The value and disposition ofthe property in Mexico; 
5. 
Whether there should be an unequal division community property that was not 
allocated pursuant to the stipulation included, the Mexico Property, the 
2009 tax return, the Edward Jones retirement account and the equity in the Airport 
Road house; 
Whether to award spousal support and if so much and how long; and 
6. Whether to award attorney fees. 
Mag. Tran. p. 7 (8:9-21). Apparently, the attorneys neglected to advise the Court at this point that 
an additional unresolved issue was whether the divorce should be granted based on irreconcilable 
differences, as requested by Pedro, or based on adultery, as requested by Bertha. 
After accepting the Stipulation, the Court began receiving evidence. The parties were not 
fInished at the end of the day on February 26,2010 so trial was continued to March 8, 2010. 
Mag. Tran. p. 55 (197). On March 4, 2010 Bertha fIled a Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation 
discussed above, which was supported by the Affidavit of Scott Axline. Clerk's Record p. 47-65. 
The motion argued that the Fort Hall property was actually worth much more than the $125,000 
to which the parties had stipulated. In his affidavit, Mr. Axline alleged that he was misled 
regarding the value of the property based on statements made during settlement negotiations. Mr. 
Axline also alleged that notwithstanding having an interpreter he had not effectively 
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communicated with Bertha on this issue and therefore did not understand that Bertha believed the 
property to be worth more. 
On March 8, 2010, Pedro filed his Objection to Motion to Set Aside Stipulation and 
before trial started that day the Court heard oral argument on Bertha's motion. Mag. Tran. 55, 
58 (l97:9-p. 212:1-19). During oral argument Pedro moved to strike portions Axline's 
affidavit which were hearsay. Mag. Tran. p. 55 (199:6-25). The Court said it was denying 
Bertha's Motion to Set the Stipulation in one breath and then the next breath stated that 
it is "only fair that the Court consider the potential inequities of its previous stipUlation, you 
know, and the way the property and income ofthe parties is to be divided." Mag. Tran. p. 
(211:17-p. 212:1-19). Thereafter, Court proceeded to hear testimony on March 8, but 
parties were not finished at the end of the day so Trial continued on March 12,2010. Mag. Tran. 
p. 91 (342). 
The trial concluded on March 12, 2010 and the parties made closing arguments. Mag. 
Tran. p. 102-108 (386: I3-pAI2: 1-4). The parties also filed various post trial memoranda. The 
parties arguments and the evidence those arguments is based on is summarized as follows: 
Grounds for divorce: Pedro testified that there were problems in the marriage that could 
not be worked out. Mag. Tran. p. 3 (103: 1-6). Pedro presented evidence that Bertha had tried 
to poison him, that she cut holes in new shirts and that she had water in his gas tank. Pedro 
testified about an incident about six months before separation when Bertha served him coffee at a 
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family gathering. Pedro gave his coffee to a brother, but before the brother could drink any 
Bertha grabbed the coffee and threw it in the sink saying it was too cold. Mag. Tran. p. 35 17-
120). Pedro confronted Bertha with allegation and testified that started crying and 
promised not to do it again. Mag. Tran. p. 36 (122:7-15). Pedro testified that the last four to 
months before separated from Bertha he started finding holes in the chest area of his shirts. He 
talked about getting burned welding at work because skin was exposed. Pedro ',"-"\.UH.''-' 
that he confronted Bertha with this accusation that she did not deny having done it, and 
sew the holes shut. Mag. Tran. p. 93-94 (352: 18-25-p. 354: 1-3). 
Bertha denied trying to poison Pedro or cutting holes in his shirts, but admitted to putting 
water in his gas tank. Mag. Tran. p. 91 (344:16-23). Nonetheless, Pedro asked the Court to grant 
the divorce based on irreconcilable differences because he was not interested throwing mud 
around, but simply wanted to be out marriage and to move on with his life. 
Bertha argued that the divorce should be granted based on adultery or extreme cruelty. 
However, Bertha did not allege extreme cruelty in her counterclaim and it is difficult to find any 
actual reference to extreme cruelty in the record. Bertha's primary evidence regarding adultery 
consisted of testimony from various witnesses that Pedro did not come home one night (Mag. 
Tran. p. 52-53 (187-189)); was seen at a with another woman (Mag. Tran. p. 64-65 (236-
237)); told a co-worker that he had another woman (Mag. p. 49 (174: 1-11)) and admitted to 
his children that he had a child from another relationship (Mag. Tran. p. 65-66 (239: 16-p. 240:1-
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12, p. 241: 1-14)). Pedro disputed these allegations and explained how his children were mistaken 
about their conversation because he certainly did not have a child from another relationship. 
Mag. Tran. 93 (349:10-21). Bertha's motivation to allege adultery was to come out ahead 
financially in the divorce by proving fault and thereby receive an unequal distribution of propeliy 
and spousal support. 
Spousal Support: Pedro argued that he should not pay spousal support principally 
because Bertha is capable of working and there are jobs available. Pedro never asked Bertha not 
to work, rather, he encouraged her to go work when their youngest child was approximately two 
(2) years of age because they had family close by who could take care of the child. Tran. p. 
34,39 (115:2-13, p. 135:2-25). Bertha did not go to outside the home at that point, but 
when youngest was about which was about 13 years before the trial, Bertha did go 
to work for Wada Farms at a job that Pedro helped her get. Mag. Tran. p. 39-40 (135:20-25-p. 
137:1-6). Rosa Sanchez, a Human Resource employee from Wada Farms, testified that Bertha 
had worked for Wada Farms on and off since 1997. Id. Starting in 2002 Bertha worked until 
2006 for two different Wada Farm entities, namely the warehouse and the field. Mag. Tran. p. 
14-15 (36: 15-p. 39: 1-6). Bertha made the bulk of her money by working for the warehouse, but 
also made money working from the field. There was no explanation regarding what was meant 
by warehouse or field, other that those designations refer to separate Wada Farm companies. 
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Some years Bertha worked for both the warehouse and the field and in other years worked for 
only one. During those years Bertha earned: 
1. 2002-$4,000 field 
1. 2003-$6,193.32 warehouse + $1,069.01 field =$7,262.33 
2. 2004-$13,120.97 warehouse +$804.95 field=$13,925.92 
3. 2005-$15,503.23 warehouse 
2006-$8,665.58 warehouse 
Mag. Tran. p. 14-15 (36:15-p. 37:1-20). 
Ms. Sanchez C"-"'I.LlH"U Bertha took a ten day leave absence in 2006 to go on 
vacation and did not return to work. Mag. p. 15 (37:21-p. 38:1-5). Ms. Sanchez also 
testified that Bertha was eligible to be rehired and that there would a full time job available 
anywhere from two weeks to a month. Mag. Tran. p. 15 (38:6-22). The starting pay would be 
$7.25 per hour. Mag. Tran. 15 (38:23-24). 
Charlie Hopkins, a Human Resources employee from Nonpareil Corporation, testified 
that a Hispanic woman about 50 years old that doesn't speak English would have a very good 
chance of getting hired. Mag. Tran. p. 18 (49:5-13). Additionally, the time it would take for 
someone like Bertha to actually start working was 15 to 21 days with a starting wage of$8.35 per 
hour. Mag. Tran. p. 18 (49: 14-p. 50:1-19). After about 15 weeks the pay would increase to $8.60 
per hour and if someone shows useful skills or that they are good at what they do then there is 
continuing opportunity for advancement. Mag. Tran. p. 18 (50:20-p. 51:1-11).The evidence 
showed that Bertha could make a starting wage of $8.35 per hour which would translate into 
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approximately $16,000 during her first year of employment. I Thereafter, Bertha's income would 
increase as she received raises and gained seniority. 
However, evidence showed that Bertha made very little if any effort to find a job between 
the filing of the divorce complaint and trial. Mag. Tran. p. 9-10 (l6:2-p. 17:1-10). Bertha 
testified that she applied for one job and that was at Nonpareil about one month before trial, 
however, Mr. Hopkins testified that his office had no record of Bertha applying for a SInce 
January 1,2010. Mag. Tran. p. 18 (51:15-p. 52:1-8). Generally, the evidence indicated that 
Bertha did not want to work as she would rather stay home and care for her grand children. Mag. 
Tran. p. 27-28 (88:18-p.89: 
Division of Community Property: The property left to divide was 2009 tax return, 
the equity in the Airport road house and the Mexico property. Pedro argued that community 
property not allocated in the Stipulation should divided equally inasmuch as Bertha had not 
overcome the presumption in favor dividing community property equally. Bertha argued that 
community property should be divided unequally, such that she should receive all community 
property not already divided by the stipulation. Bertha's arguments focused on the alleged 
adultery and her alleged inability to support herself after the divorce. 
parties own two separate parcels of property in Mexico. However, one piece of 
property Bertha received by inheritance and Pedro was making no claim as to that parcel. Mag. 
1$8.35 x 40 hours=$334 per week. $334 x 48 weeks=$16,032. 
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Tran. p. 34 (113). The parties acquired the other parcel during their marriage and it cost them 
about $5,000. Mag. Tran. 34,40 (113, p.l38:16-p. 139:1). It is located in Tula Jalisco, 
Mexico, and parties were making a claim to Mag. Tran. p. 29-30, 34 (96:20-p. 97:1-10, 
p. 113). Pedro testified that he was to buyout Bertha's interest the Mexico property 
for $4,500. Mag. Tran. p. 36 (124). On direct examination Bertha agreed that she would sell her 
interest in the property $4,500, but after consulting \vlth her attorney during a break 
testified that she was not willing to be bought out for $4,500. Pedro testified to the property 
his opinion was worth $23,000. Mag. Tran. p. 40 (138:16-19). 
Child Support: Pedro has a third grade education and works in maintenance at General 
Mills. Mag. Tran. p. 123. Pedro testified that he was making $16.23 an hour, but that his annual 
income was more because he works voluntary overtime. Mag. Tran. p. 32 (105-106). Pedro's tax 
returns for 2007-2009 show he averaged $49,860 those years. Trial Exhibits VV (p. 137), WW 
(p. 152) and XX (p. 173). Pedro testified that he generally works about 45 hours week except 
during harvest when he works 60 to 65 hours per week. Mag. Tran. p. 37 (126: 14-24}. Pedro 
testified that not all of the people on his crew worked the long over time hours. Mag. Tran. p. 38 
(131-132). Jose Hernandez, a co-worker, also testified that overtime was voluntary except at 
harvest. Mag. Tran. p. 49 75,178}. 
Pedro argued that child support should be set at $440 per month based on Bertha making 
minimum wage of$15,080 per year and Pedro's regular income of$35,000 per year because all 
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over time was voluntary. However, to the extent there is mandatory overtime it was only for two 
months during harvest. Further, Pedro argued that child support should begin when the Court 
makes a final decision because up to that point Pedro paid the mortgage payment and other 
expenses totaling approximately $1,300 per month. As reflected in Exhibit 2, Pedro paid for 
dish satellite, car insurance, sewer and trash, and house payment. Trial Exhibits p. 14-15. 
Pedro paid some of these expenses through December 2009 while the dish satellite was paid 
through March 2010 and Pedro even today cormnues to make the house payment. Tran. 
32-33 (108-110). 
Bertha argued that child support should be set at $614.67 per month based on Pedro 
making $52,000 per year and Bertha making nothing.2 argued that support should 
begin as of the date the divorce complaint was filed Pedro should not be given credit for 
voluntarily paying various bills and expenses because the money used was community 
income, he was obligated to make the house payment anyway and he was obligated to support his 
child. 
Attorney Fees: Pedro argued that the parties should pay their own attorney fees and 
pointed out that Bertha has litigated this case very aggressively which has lead to her running up 
2This is Bertha's argument even though from 2007 through 2009 Pedro had never made more 
that $50,980 and Bertha was fully capable of making more than minimum wage. Trial Exhibits p. 
137, 152 and 173. 
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her bill for attorney fees. Bertha argued that attorney fees should be awarded, because she had 
insufficient means to pay her attorney. 
On May 18,2010 Trial Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Judgment 
Regarding Divorce, Custody and Child Support ("Memorandum Decision"). To summarize the 
Memorandum Decision, the Court ruled as 
1. The divorce was granted based on irreconcilable differences. The Court noted that 
there was evidence of adulterous behavior, but ultimately the Court found that 
np"Trt,>r party has been kind to one another for a significant period 
which suggests possible mutual extreme cruelty. the final analysis, the marriage 
is irretrievably broken and the differences between the parties appear as the 
primary 'cause"'. Memorandum Decision p. 6-7. 
2. Bertha asked for an unequal division of community property principally because 
her earning capacity is less than Pedro's and also because of Pedro's alleged fault 
regarding the break-up of the marriage. The Court indicated that it would not 
award Bertha an unequal portion of community property because Court 
that income disparity was best addressed spousal support. The Court divided 
the retirement account and 2009 tax return' equally, but awarded Bertha 
Mexico property without offset. Memorandum Decision p. 2-3. 
3. Regarding child support the court found Pedro's regular wage was $35,000 per 
year, but that Pedro had averaged $49,000 a year because of overtime income. The 
Court found that Pedro had failed to overcome the presumption in favor of income 
inclusion and therefore found that for child support purposes Pedro's income 
would be $49,000. The Court also found that Pedro would not receive credit 
against child support for the monies he paid during the pendency of the divorce to 
support his child Amulfo. Memorandum Decision p. 3-4. 
4. Regarding Spousal Support, the Court found that Bertha would have a cash flow 
problem as a result of the divorce and therefore determined to award spousal 
3 Although the tax return was not identified as an issue at the beginning of trial, it became an 
issue during trial. Mag. Tran. p. 97 (366:6-18). 
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support. The Court recognized that an award of spousal support "with permanent 
application defeats the rehabilitative purpose of the award", but then went on to 
award spousal support for 13 years, which has the effect of a permanent 
maintenance award because Pedro will be 61 when it ends. Pedro is ordered to pay 
Bertha $800 a month for 7 years and then $400 a month for the final seven years. 
Memorandum Decision p. 5-6. 
5. Regarding attorney fees the Court ordered Pedro to pay Bertha $2,500 in attorney 
fees based on the disparity income. Memorandum Decision p. 7. 
Clerk's Record p. 70-78. 
h"",..,'>+"'"A as a result of the Memorandum Decision and parties stipulation Pedro was 
ordered to pay $800 per month alimony, $558 per month in back child support, $2,500 in 
attorney fees and at the same pay the house payment of approximately $1,190 per month. 
Clerk's Record p. 142. Not including the attorney fees this amounted to a Hl'-/HU,U obligation of 
$2,458. When the house on Airport Road sells it will lessen Pedro's burden, but the house has 
not sold as of this wTiting. See Affidavit of Pedro Pelayo Support Motion to Augment 
Record. 
On June 1, 2010 Jonathan W. Harris substituted in as attorney of record for Pedro and 
filed a Motion for New Trial and/or to Alter or Amend Judgment supported by a Memorandum 
and Affidavit of Pedro. Clerk's Record p. 80-96. On June 25, 2010 Bertha filed a Motion to 
Strike portions of Pedro's Affidavit and an opposition Pedro's Motion for New Trial and/or to 
Alter or Amend Judgment. On July 13,2010 the Court heard Pedro's Motion for New 
and/or to Alter or Amend Judgment. Ruling from the bench, the Court denied Pedro's Motion. 
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Clerk's Record p. 100-101. However, the Trial Court indicated that if the house on Airport Road 
had not sold by January 1,2011 that the Court would entertain a motion for from the 
burdensome obligations Pedro was saddled with as a result of the Trial Court's decision. Mag. 
Tran. p. 122 (467:18-23). 
On July 29,2010 Pedro a Notice of Appeal with the District Court and on 
September 1,2010 the Decree of Divorce was entered. Clerk's Record 97-99, 102-107. On 
December 10, 2010 Notice of Lodging Reporter's Transcript on Appeal was On January 6, 
2011 Pedro filed a Motion to Stay the Appeal together with a Stipulation to Stay the Appeal 
the Appellate Court. Clerk's Record p. 109-115, 137. The Appellate Court signed the Order to 
Stay Appeal on January 1 2011. Clerk's Record p. 138-139. The Appeal was stayed in order 
for the Trial Court to resolve Pedro's Motion for Relief from Court Order which was also 
on January 6,2011. Clerk's Record p. 134-36. 
The basis for Pedro's Motion for Relief from Court Order was that the house on Airport 
Road did not sell by January 1,2011 so Pedro accepted the Trial Court's invitation to file a 
Motion for Relief, wherein Pedro asked the Court to ease his financial burdens because he was 
having to pay child support, alimony and still make the house payment. On February 14,2011 
the Trial Court heard Pedro's Motion for Relief from Court Order. However, the Trial Court 
indicated that it would not grant Pedro relief from the Court order without receiving updated, 
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current infonnation on Pedro's current income and fmancial obligations. Pedro argued that his 
financial situation was not so different that new evidence needed to be submitted to the Court. 
Nonetheless, the Court disagreed so on February 28, 2011 Pedro filed his atlidavit in 
support of his Motion for Relief from Court Order. Clerk's Record p. 142-157. On March 11, 
1 Bertha filed an objection to the Motion for Relieffrom Court Order together with the 
Affidavit of Scott "-"-U,Uv. On April 4, 2011 Pedro's attorney, Jonathan Harris, filed an 
Affidavit and Supplemental Briefin Support of Motion for Relief from Court Order. Clerk's 
Record p. 158-161. On April 26, 2011 the Court entered an Order and Judgment denying Pedro's 
Motion for Relief from Court Order. Clerk's Record p. 169. Thereafter, the District Court appeal 
proceeded forward and on June 8, 2011 Bertha filed a Cross Appeal. Clerk's Record p. 1 -173. 
On June 23,2011 Pedro tIled a Motion to Dismiss the Cross Appeal. Clerk's Record p. 174-179. 
On July 21,2011 the Court granted Pedro's Motion to Dismiss the Cross AppeaL Clerk's 
Record p. 182-186. 
On August 29,2011 Pedro filed his opening briehvith the District Court. On October 11, 
2011, Bertha filed her responsive brief and on October 24,2011 Pedro filed his reply brief. On 
November 28,2011 the District Court heard oral argument on Pedro's appeaL On appeal to the 
District Court Pedro argued the following: 
1. That the Trial Court erred in awarding the Mexico property to Bertha without an offset in 
favor of Pedro and in particular that the Trial Court erred in disregarding the parties 
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stipulation and considering that the property which Pedro received pursuant to the 
stipulation may be worth more than what the stipulation states. 
2. That the Trial Court erred in relying on adultery in awarding spousal maintenance. 
3. That the Trial Court erred by making spousal maintenance punitive rather and 
4. 
5. 
rehabilitative in as much Trial Court awarded 13 years of maintenance when the 
evidence shows that Bertha can support herselfthrough employment and property she 
received or will receive. 
That the Trial Court erred in setting Pedro's income at $49,000 a 
child support purposes. 
for 
the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to Bertha. 
6. That Pedro was entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Exhibits - Appeal Briefs p. 2. 
Bertha defended the Trial Court's decision in all respects arguing the Trial Court had not 
erred. Exhibits - Appeal Briefs p. 43. On January 23, 2012 the District Court entered it's 
Decision and Order on Appeal p. 43. In its Decision and Order on Appeal the District Court ruled 
in Bertha's favor in all respects except as to the Mexico Property. Clerk's Record p. 202-206. On 
that issue the District Court ruled that the Trial Court abused discretion by distributing 
Mexico property entirely to Bertha and remanded the matter back to the Trial Court. 
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On March 5,2012 Pedro filed a Notice of Appeal whereby this matter is docketed with 
the Idaho Court Supreme Court. Clerk's Record p. 229-232. On Apri118, 2012 the Notice of 
Lodging of the Clerk's Record was filed. Neither party objected to the Clerk's record. 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. \Vhether Trial Court erred in relying on adultery in awarding spousal 
maintenance. 
B. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by awarding spousal maintenance. 
\Vhether the Trial Court erred in the duration and amount of spousal maintenance 
because the award was not supported by substantial competent evidence and was punitive rather 
than rehabilitative. 
D. Whether the Trial Court erred in setting Pedro's income at $49,000 a year 
child support purposes. 
Vlhether the Court abused its discretion awarding the attorney's fees to 
Bertha. 
F. Whether Pedro is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
III. ST At~DARDS OF REVIEW 
A. GENERALLY 
This Court should affirm factual findings ofthe Trial Court where they are supported by 
substantial competent evidence. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 765 P .2d 1094 
(Ct.App.1988). However, this Court exercises free review over matters oflaw. Bolger v. Lance, 
137 Idaho 792, 794,53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002) (citing Bouten Const£. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson 
Co., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999)). 
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B. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE 
There is some confusion regarding the standard of review for spousal maintenance. In 
Mulch v Mulch, 125 Idaho 93, 97,867 P.2d 967, 971 (1994) the Court held: 
Despite the reference to an abuse of discretion a standard of review some of 
these opinions, it is clear that as to findings that are the basis for a decision to 
award spousal maintenance pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-705(1), the Court has 
applied a substantial and competent evidence standard of review. This is 
consistent with the "clearly erroneous" standard ofIRCP 52(a). In Barber v 
Honomf, 116 Idaho 767, 780 P.2d 89, 92(1989), the Court that a finding 
of fact that is not clearly erroneous is supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. 
Later, the Mulch Court also held that in reviewing amount and duration of the award 
spousal maintenance, substantial competent evidence is likewise the standard of review. 
In the more recent case of Stewart v Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 152 P.3d 544(2007), the 
Court held that whether to allow alimony amount thereof "are in first instance 
committed to the Court's discretion." Id. at 677. However the Stewart Court also stated: 
Regarding spousal maintenance, this Court reviews the trial court's findings "that 
are the basis for the court's decision as to the duration and the amount of spousal 
maintenance to determine whether there exists substantial and competent evidence 
in support of these findings." 
Id. The best way to reconcile these cases is to say that the initial decision on whether to award 
spousal maintenance is discretionary, but that amount and duration of the award must be 
supported by substantial competent evidence. See Robinson v. Robinson, 136 Idaho 451, 453, 35 
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P.3d 268 (2001)(holding that the amount and duration of an award of spousal maintenance are 
reviewed based on the substantial competent evidence standard).To the extent Mulch and Stewart 
are irreconcilable, it should be noted that Stewart cited Mulch without any discussion that Mulch 
was being over turned, whereas in Mulch the Court was focused on the question of what the 
standard of review was for an award of spousal maintenance and plainly stated 
abuse of discretion. Thus, Mulch should take precedence over Stewart. 
it was not 
District Court accepted Pedro's argument to reconcile Mulch Stewart in as much 
as it reviewed the decision to award spousal maintenance under "abuse of discretion", and 
reviewed the duration and amount award under the "substantial competent evidence" 
standard. Clerk's Record p. 199. 
C. CHILD SUPPORT 
The Trial Court's determination of the Pedro's income for child support purposes must be 
supported by substantial competent evidence. Drinkall v. Drinkall, 150 Idaho 606, 610,249 P.3d 
405 (CLApp. 2011)(holding that trial court's determination of father's gross income was support 
by substantial competent evidence). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. SPOUSAL IVIAINTENANCE 
The Trial Court ordered Pedro to pay monthly spousal maintenance as follows: (1) 
Beginning July 1,2010, $800 per month for seven years, (2) then $400 per month until Bertha is 
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62, which is another 7 years for a total of 13 years. Pedro's date of birth in so at 
the time oftrial he was 47 years old. Mag. Tran. p. 30 (99:16-19). Bertha was 48 years old at the 
time of trial \vith her birthday in May. Mag. Tran. p. 30 (97:1 -19). Thus, under the Trial Court's 
order Pedro will be paying Bertha $800 a month until is 56 years old and be paying her 
$400 per month for another 6 years until he is 61 and she is 62. This amounts to a total 
maintenance award of $1 00,800 and amounts to a permanent maintenance, which is disfavored. 
The Trial Court erred in several respects as it pertains to Spousal Maintenance. the 
Trial Court erred as a matter oflaw in relying on alleged adultery to award Spousal Maintenance. 
Second, the Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding spousal maintenance when Bertha can 
support herself through employment. Third, the Trial Court erred in awarding spousal 
maintenance for a duration and amounts not supported by substantial competent evidence, 
which is punitive rather than rehabilitative and in so doing ignored evidence that Betha is capable 
of working and that there is work available for her. 
1. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Relying on Adultery 
The Trial Court states on pages 6 and 7 of the Memorandum Decision as follows: 
This Court is asked by Bertha that both adultery and extreme 
cruelty be listed as grounds. Pedro would have that "no fault" or 
irreconcilable differences be provided as cause of the broken 
marital covenant. In this court's view, when grounds are at issue, 
the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
stated ground is the actual "cause" of dissolution. Certainly, 
evidence was provided that gives the court high suspicion of 
adulterous behavior on the part of Pedro, which the court has 
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considered when addressing spousal support. Additionally, the 
evidence provides that neither party has been particularly kind to 
one another for a significant period which suggests possible mutual 
extreme cruelty. the final analysis, the marriage is irretrievably 
broken and the differences between the parties appear as the 
primary "cause". 
Clerk's Record p. 75-76. The Trial Court found by a preponderance that the marriage is 
irretrievably broken based on irreconcilable differences and that the divorce was granted on 
basis. In light ofthe Trial Court's decision to grant the divorce based on irreconcilable 
differences, Trial Court not then consider adultery addressing spousal support. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 32-705(g) the Trial Court can consider the fault of either party in 
awarding spousal maintenance. However, cases make it clear that adultery must be proven as 
follows: 
When the cause of adultery is relied upon for a divorce, such 
charge should be stated with sufficient definiteness and certainty of 
the time and place as will enable the Defendant to know what he 
will be called upon to meet at trial (citations omitted).... This 
Court has announced that it is a matter of public policy that the 
divorces, especially on the ground of adultery, should be granted 
only upon very clear and conclusive evidence. Brown v. Brown, 
27 Idaho 205, 148 PAS. Leonard v. Leonard, 88 Idaho 485 at 490, 
491,401 P.2d 541 at 544 (1965). 
Bramerv. Bramer, 93 Idaho 671, 674,471 P.2d 58 (1970). 
If Bertha did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Pedro engaged in 
adultery, then she absolutely did not prove by very clear and conclusive evidence that adultery 
had occurred. Thus, Bertha did not prove adultery by either evidentiary standard and the Trial 
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Court should not, as a matter of law, rely upon adultery to aw'ard spousal support to Bertha, but 
that is exactly what the Trial Court did. 
Pedro argued to the District Court that the Trial Court cannot grant a divorce based on 
irreconcilable differences and thereafter consider that Pedro may have committed adultery 
determining whether to award spousal maintenance. Pedro's rational for this argument was 
based upon the logical conclusion that there is only one practical difference between getting 
divorced based on fault" irreconcilable differences and a fault basis, such as adultery. 
difference is that if the divorce is awarded based on fault then the innocent party can come out 
ahead financially in terms of spousal maintenance or unequal division of community property. 
Othem'ise, a divorce based on irreconcilable differences and a divorce based on fault are no 
different, parties end up divorced with property and debt divided between them. 
Speaking generally, if divorce litigants are going to use the Court's time and resources in 
an effort to prove that fault, such as adultery, is the cause of the divorce, one would think 
that there would be a practical and sensible purpose for proving fault If as Bertha argues a party 
can get divorced for irreconcilable differences and then still seek to prove fault for purposes of 
spousal maintenance or unequal property division, then why would anyone ever try to prove 
fault caused the divorce in the first instance? This is especially the case it is also true that 
proving fault for purposes of spousal maintenance or property division burden of proof is 
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something less than clear and conclusive evidence. See Brammer v. Brammer,93 Idaho 671, 
674,471 P.2d 58 (l970)(holding that adultery must be proven by clear and conclusive evidence). 
Notwithstanding the logic of these arguments, this author acknowledges Marmon v. 
Marmon, 121 Idaho 480,825 P.2d 1136 (1992); Le Vine v. Spickelmier, 109 Idaho 341, 707 
P.2d 452 (1985); and Neveau v Neveau, 103 Idaho 707, 652 P.2d 655(1982). Those cases seem 
to sustain what the Trial Court did, namely granting the divorce based on irreconcilable 
differences and then considering Pedro's fault in awarding spousal maintenance even though 
adultery was not proven to be the cause of the divorce. However, those cases are distinguishable 
because they all dealt with previous versions of the spousal maintenance statute. 
Neveau dealt v<rith an early and constitutionally deficient of the spousal 
maintenance statute designated as I.C. § 32-706 which provided, relevant part: 
Where as divorce is granted for an offense of the husband ... the court may 
compel him to provide for the maintenance of the children of the marriage, and to 
make such suitable allowance to the v.rife her support as the court may deem 
just, having regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively; and the court 
may, from time to time, modify its orders in these regards. 
In Marmon and Spickelmier the relevant statute was designated as § 32-705 and provided: 
Where a divorce is granted, for an offense of either spouse, including a divorce 
granted upon the complaint of the party at fault, the court may grant a 
maintenance order for the innocent spouse if it finds that the innocent spouse 
seeking maintenance: 
(a) Lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable 
needs; and 
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(b) Is unable to support himself or herself through employment. 
Thus, all three cases dealt with versions of the statute which required the divorce be granted 
based on fault as a condition precedent to receiving and award of spousal maintenance. See 
Marmon v. Marmon, 121 Idaho at 482 (holding an a party charged with maintenance must be 
found at fault). 
Notwithstanding the unambiguous requirement that divorce be granted on a fault basis as 
a condition for awarding CUllHViH these decisions did not follow the statutes in that regard. For 
example, in Spickelmier the divorce was granted based on irreconcilable differences, but the 
Trial Court awarded spousal maintenance anyway. Spickelmier, 109 Idaho at 343. On appeal the 
district court in Spickelmier agreed that spousal maintenance could not be awarded without a 
finding of fault and thus, remanded to the magistrate court. Id. On remand the magistrate court 
made a finding that the husband's fault was the chief cause of the divorce as support for the 
award of spousal maintenance. The reported opinion does not state what the husband did that 
caused the marriage to fail. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the husband argued that the 
factors in I.C. § 32-705 were not properly considered, but the Supreme Court rejected this 
argument with little to no discussion. Id. at 345. Thus, the Spickelmier court ignored the plain 
language of the statute requiring that divorce be granted "for an offense of either spouse", as a 
condition precedent to awarding spousal maintenance. 
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Therefore, Mannon, Spickelmier and Neveau are distinguishable because they dealt 
previous versions ofIdaho's spousal maintenance statutes, and with all due respect, the decisions 
ignored the plain and unambiguous language requiring fault to be the basis for the divorce. 
In response to Pedro's Motion for Trial and/or to Alter or Amend Judgement, the 
Trial Court had an opportunity to explain reasoning for considering fault as a factor in 
awarding spousal maintenance. Trial Court stated ruling from the bench: 
But the fault factor doesn't to be necessarily one-sided. I they 
were potentially mutually extremely cruel; ... the statute says to, to look at fault 
is another way saying look at innocence. Who was the more innocent spouse in 
!hi ? s. 
And I think generally Bertha was the more innocent spouse rather than 
looking at it as that he was mostly at fault, you know, for the breakup of the 
marriage and just kind of the, relationship. She was in my view, probably the 
more innocent spouse .... she's not blameless, and certainly he wasn't blameless. 
But to find the cause ofthe breakup, that's why listed it as irreconcilable 
differences after getting a feel for these folks during these three days. 
Mag. Tran. p. 119 (455:21-25; 456:1-12). 
In other words the Trial Court takes the position that it can generally evaluate how cruel 
the parties were to each other and which ever party was less cruel may come out ahead 
financially, notwithstanding that irreconcilable differences is the cause of the divorce. This 
methodology is totally improper. There is one and only one reason for a divorce litigant to try to 
prove fault of the other party and that reason is to obtain spousal support or an unequal division 
of community property. However, before a court can consider fault in making such an award, 
fault has to be proven in according to the applicable evidentiary standard. See I.C. § 32-603. 
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Bertha did not prove adultery, so as a matter of law the Trial Court cannot consider the alleged 
adultery in awarding spousal support. The Trial Court correctly granted the divorce based on 
irreconcilable differences, thus the Court cannot then weigh innocence/cruelty of the parties and 
reward what ever party was less cruel, or more innocent and as a coronary punish more cruel/less 
innocent spouse. 
If the Trial Court was correct to factor Bertha's relative innocense into spousal support 
granting the divorce based on irreconcilable differences, then open the flood gates to 
litigants to clog up the courts with evidence about every negative attribute of their spouse even if 
they have insufficient evidence to prove fault under I.C. § 32-603. Parties can stipulate to a 
divorce based on irreconcilable differences so issue is resolved and still have a knock down 
drag it out fight about who is more innocent. IfIdaho law allows this in light of Marmon v. 
Marmon, Le Vine v. Spickelmier and Neveau v Neveau, then this Court should revisit the 
question and rule that such methodology is improper. For reasons stated above, divorce litigants 
should have to make a choice as to whether they will pursue a divorce based on fault or "no 
fault", and not a hybrid of the two which the Trial Court embraced in this case. 
Thus, the Trial and District Courts erred as a matter oflaw and this Court should 
terminate or reduce spousal maintenance accordingly, or remand to the Trial Court with 
instructions to terminate or reduce the award of spousal maintenance. 
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2. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding Spousal 
Maintenance When Bertha Has Sufficient Property And Is Able To 
Support Herself Through Employment. 
I.C. § 32-705 provides: 
1. Where a divorce is decreed, the court may grant a maintenance 
order if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance: 
(a) Lacks sufficient property to provide for his or 
her reasonable needs; and 
(b) Is unable to support himself or herself through 
employment. 
2. The maintenance order shaH be in such amounts and for such 
periods of time that the court deems just, after considering all 
relevant factors which may include: 
(a) The financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance, 
including the marital property apportioned to said spouse, and said 
spouse's ability to meet his or her needs independently; 
(b) The necessary to acquire sufficient education and training 
to enable the spouse seeking maintenance to find employment; 
(c) The duration of the marriage; 
(d) The age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse 
seeking maintenance; 
(e) The ability spouse from whom maintenance is sought to 
meet his or her needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking 
maintenance; 
(f) The tax consequences to each spouse; 
(g) The fault of either party. 
To award spousal maintenance the Trial Court needed to find that Bertha lacked sufficient 
property to provide for her reasonable needs and that she is unable to support herself through 
employment. In addition, spousal maintenance is designed to be rehabilitative and give the 
receiving spouse an incentive to start working. See Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331, 334-335, 
900 P.2d 807 (Ct.App.1995)(Court of Appeals agreed that the district court was correct in 
Page 28 of 43 
reducing the alimony because the permanent nature ofthe award provided no incentive for the 
recipient to obtain full time employment). 
Bertha was awarded substantial property in the divorce. She will receive $62,500 for her 
share of the Fort Hall property; She \vill receive one-half equity in the Airport Road Property4; 
Pursuant to the District Court order she receive one-half of the Mexico Property which she 
valued at $9,000 and Pedro valued at $23,000; She received another piece of property located 
Mexico that she inherited from morn; She received one-half of Pedro' s retirement account; 
and she gets to live in the Airport Road Property for free until it sells. Thus, Bertha has no 
housing expense until the Airport Road house sells at which point she -will receive all the 
proceeds from sale of that property because she will receive her half and Pedro's half. To the 
extent Pedro's half is insufficient to pay the $62,500 he owes her, he is required to try and get a 
loan against the Fort Hall property and pay her the rest ofthe $62,500. The parties estimated that 
they owed $80,000 on the house and that they would list it for about $140,000 Mag. Tran. p. 3, 7 
and 469. 
If it sold for $140,000 and the parties paid the $80,000 mortgage plus a six percent realtor 
commission then there would be $51,600 which would all go to Bertha and within six months 
4 The Memorandum Decision does not actually state how the proceeds from the sale of the 
Airport Road property were to be split. The Trial Court apparently intended for them to be split 
equally since it made no specific finding that it was to be split unequally as the Court did with the 
Mexico Property. The parties apparently assumed that the Court intended for the sale proceeds to be 
split equally since paragraph 8(a) of the decree of provides that Pedro 'hill pay his share to Bertha 
so that part of the $62,500 would get paid to her at that point. 
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she could expect to receive another $36,700. Thus, Bertha would have around $88,300 to get into 
a different house. However, to be fair the house has not sold as of this briefing, the principal 
owed on the house is reduced to $65,330.79 as of June 15,2012 and the listing price has been 
reduced to $130,000. Whether this information is in the record will depend on how the Court 
rules on Pedro's Motion to Augment the Record. See Affidavit of Pedro Pelayo In Support of 
Motion to Augment the Record.5 IfBertha were to sell one or both of the Mexico properties and 
cash out the retirement, she would have even more money to put towards a new Given the 
real estate market and the fact that Bertha only needs enough room for herself she can easily 
secure and new place to live for that amount. 
For most people their mortgage and their vehicle payments are their largest monthly 
expenses. If Bertha uses approximate $88,300 she will receive wisely, she will not have a 
mortgage payment. Bertha received a Toyota Corolla in the divorce and there was no evidence of 
any debt on the same. Thus, Bertha will have the two major expenses taken care so she can live 
on the $16,000 to $17,000 per year she can earn as a beginning wage working at Nonpareil or 
Wada. Perhaps there are other jobs available to Bertha which pay more or which she would find 
more enjoyable. However, no one knows because Bertha has done virtually nothing to try and 
find employment. Bertha testified that she took an application to Nonpareil, but Nonpareil had no 
5Ifthe Airport Road house sells for $130,000, then after a 6% realtor's commission and 
current payoff to the bank, the net would be $56,869.21. 
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record of If Bertha were interested in working she obviously would have done something more 
to try and find employment between the divorce getting filed and trial about nine months later. 
Clearly, Bertha can support herself through a combination of the property she received 
and through employment income. Thus, Bertha has not met the threshold requirements to qualifY 
for spousal support. Notwithstanding this, Trial Court awarded Bertha 13 years of spousal 
support which goes far beyond the rehabilitative nature of spousal support. 
3. The Trial Court Erred In Rendering An Award Of Spousal 
Maintenance In An Amount And For A Duration Not Supported By 
Substantial Competent Evidence And \Vhich Is Punitive Rather Than 
Rehabilitative. 
Even if this Court believes that the Trial Court did not abuse discretion awarding 
spousal maintenance, the seven years of $800 per month and six years of $400 per month is not 
supported by substantial competent evidence, and is punitive rather rehabilitative. I.C. §32-
705 and case law supports that the primary focus with respect to spousal maintenance is the need 
of the recipient spouse. The "standard ofliving during the marriage is but one piece ofthe initial 
maintenance inquiry and the magistrate's failure to consider it does not, by itself establish court 
error." Moffett v. Moffett, 151 Idaho 90, 253 P.3d 764 (CLApp. 2011). The reality is that 
neither, Bertha nor Pedro is likely to enjoy the same standard of living they had during the 
marriage, but that is not to say that Bertha cannot meet her reasonable needs through employment 
and property she received in the divorce. 
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Focusing on the need of the would be recipient spouse and the fact that spousal 
maintenance must be rehabilitative as opposed to pennanent, a party who can support themselves 
through employment is disqualified from receiving maintenance. See Phillips v. Phillips, 93 
Idaho 384, 388, 462 P.2d 49 969)(holding that while no ex-wife should be cast onto the 
welfare rolls if her fonner husband can pay maintenance "no man should be required to go 
through life following a divorce the financial millstone of a vengeful ex-wife hung around 
his neck"). As explained above, Bertha can support herself through employment. 
Bertha also failed to establish need for the alimony award she received inasmuch as she 
failed to buttress her claims for spousal maintenance with a budget or enumeration of her 
expenses. In Robinson v. Robinson, 136 Idaho 451,35 P.3d 268 (2001), the parties were married 
for about 23 years before Mr. Robinson, a physician, had an affair and the parties separated. Mrs. 
Robinson had occasionally worked outside the home during the marriage, but for the most part 
she stayed home and raised the parties children. Dr. Robinson sought a divorce on irreconcilable 
differences and Mrs. Robinson counterclaimed seeking a divorce for adultery. The reported case 
does not say whether the divorce was granted based on adultery or irreconcilable differences. The 
trial court awarded spousal maintenance in the sum of $1 ,900 per month for 1\vo years and 
$1,500 per month for a third year. 
In awarding maintenance the trial court in Robinson scrutinized Mrs. Robinson's 
proposed expenses, accepting some and rejecting others, to fmd that her reasonable needs were 
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$4,000 per month. The trial court, in Robinson, relying on Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331, 900 
P .2d 807 (Ct. App. 1995), indicated that the purpose of maintenance was rehabilitative and as 
such it felt constrained to limit maintenance to three years. Robinson at 454. 
Mrs. Robinson appealed the trial court's finding that maintenance was rehabilitative and 
the magistrate's determination that he would limit maintenance to three years. The Supreme 
Court in Robinson held that the trial court correctly applied I.C. § 32-705, noting that trial 
court properly considered time necessary for Mrs. Robinson to locate employment; to 
changes in her economic status; that she was physically 
obtained an unequal distribution of community property. 
mentally able to work; and that she 
In any case, the Robinson case is instructive because of its focus on the need of the 
recipient spouse and the recipient spouse's need to support a spousal maintenance claim with a 
budget. The trial court based its spousal maintenance award on Mrs. Robinson's reasonable 
expenses proven to the court and then limited the award to three years so that it would be 
rehabilitative and not extend beyond Mrs. Robinson's needs. Likewise, in Moffett v. Moffett, 
151 Idaho 90, 253 P .3d 764 (Ct.App. 2011), the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial 
of spousal maintenance. The Moffett Court noted that one item lacking from the record which it 
would need to assess the propriety of the trial court's decision was "the requesting spouse's 
monthly take-home pay, living expenses, and debt." See also Wilson v Wilson, 131 Idaho 533, 
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536,960 P.2d 1262(1998)(Explaining that Mrs. Wilson's claimed monthly living expenses were 
considered and some were disallowed). 
In the instant case, Bertha did not submit a budget to support expenses. III 
awarding spousal maintenance the Trial Court could do nothing guess at what would be an 
appropriate amount. The Court suggested that Bertha would be disadvantaged by not having 
health insurance6, however, was no evidence of what it would cost Bertha to purchase 
health insurance. such was not substantial competent evidence to support the duration 
and amount of the spousal maintenance award. 
Tisdale v. Tisdale, 127 Idaho 331,900 P.2d 807, (Ct.App.1995) is factually and legally 
similar to the instant case. In === the husband was making over $60,000 working for Hewlett-
Packard and the wife was certified to teach school she make $18,000. Id. at 332. 
However, at the of divorce the \vife was working as a teacher's aid making $10,000 
year. Id. The wife had been a homemaker for 28 years of the 31 year marriage, was 51 years old 
at the time of the divorce and was in good health. Id. at 335. The husband sued for divorce based 
on irreconcilable differences, but it was stipulated that he had an affair which contributed to the 
breakup ofthe marriage. Id. at 332. The Magistrate ordered the husband to pay alimony of $825 
per month until the wife remarried, obtained full-time employment with a minimum salary of 
$18,000, or the husband turned 65, whichever occurred first. Id. at 334. 
6Clerk's Record p. 75. 
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The husband appealed to the District Court which vacated the maintenance award in part 
finding that it amounted to permanent maintenance and there was not substantial competent 
evidence to justify the duration of the award. Id. at 334. The District Court modified the award of 
spousal support to limit it to three years. The could petition for an extension at the end of 
those three years, but in no case was the support to extend beyond 5 years. Id. 
The wife appealed the District Court's modification of the spousal support award. The 
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court as 
Id. at 335. 
The magistrate's reasoning focused on Mary's need to reenter the 
work force and begin supporting herself. Unfortunately, the 
permanent nature of the award provided no incentive for Mary to 
obtain full-time employment. Reviewing all the factors set forth in 
I.e. § 32-705(2), we conclude that the permanent nature of the 
award this case goes beyond the rehabilitative purposes of a 
spousal support award. 
Although we are not bound by the decision of the district court, we 
fmd its reasoning persuasive and its conclusion appropriate for this 
case. The magistrate did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
a maintenance award was necessary to anow time for Mary to 
obtain full-time employment and to establish herself financially. 
However, we agree with the district court that the evidence 
presented only supports an award of maintenance initially for a 
period of three years. Thus, we vacate the award of maintenance 
and remand for entry of judgement granting an award, in the same 
amount, for a period of three years. (Emphasis added). 
Just like in Tisdale, the 13 year maintenance award to Bertha is defective because it 
amounts to an award of permanent maintenance whereby Bertha has no incentive to get full time 
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employment and should be reversed or at least modified by this Appellate Court. Evidence at trial 
was that Bertha could work, had worked, but chose not to work. Bertha preferred to stay home 
and take care of grandchildren and her attorney attempted to justify this not with any legal 
argument, but by calling it "cultural". Mag. Tran., p. 106 (401). 
Bertha would obviously prefer to stay home and care for grandchildren. Most 
grandmothers would, however, as stated by the Court Bertha is not blameless in this divorce. She 
admitted to putting water in gas tank of Pedro's vehicle. The parties are divorced and it is not 
all Pedro's fault so rather than wallow in misery of it the Decree of Divorce needs to be 
fashioned so that the parties can get on with their rather than living in the past. Pedro cannot 
get on with his life because his present financial obligations are so daunting. Bertha has little 
incentive to get on with her 
month in alimony. 
because she is living in a house for free and is receiving $800 a 
Furthermore, the Court should consider that Pedro has had the continuing financial 
burden of making the $1,190 per month house payment on the Airport Road house and Bertha 
lives in the house for free as long as it does not sell. Clerk's Record p. 142. Pedro sought to have 
the Trial Court modify his spousal maintenance obligation when the house had not sold by 
January 1, 2011. Clerk's Record p. 134-136 (Motion for Relief from Court Order), 142-157 
(Affidavit of Pedro Pelayo In Support of Motion for Relief from Court Order), 158-161 
(Supplemental BriefIn Support orMotion for Relief from Court Order). The Trial Court 
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summarily denied Pedro's Motion for Relief from Court order based "primarily upon an 
insufficient showing of chance of circumstances rendering the judgment unjust." Clerk's Record 
p. 169. Pedro respectfully submits that the spousal maintenance award and other financial 
obligations he is saddled with in combination with having to pay the mortgage payment 
indefinitely render the Trial Court's decisions manifestly unjust. 
Thus, the Trial Court made findings not supported by substantial competent evidence. 
This Court should terminate or reduce spousal maintenance acc:onJln!Il or remand to the 
Court with instructions to terminate or reduced the award of spousal maintenance. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF PEDRO'S CHILD 
SUPPORT INCOME IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The Trial Court erred in setting Pedro's child support income at $49,000 per year, 
because there was not substantial competent evidence to support that amount. The Trial Court 
found that Pedro's regular wage was $35,000 per year, but that Pedro generated $14,000 per year 
in overtime pay which the Court included in Pedro's income for child support purposes for a total 
of $49,000 per year. Clerk's Record p. 73. Section 6(a)(1)(ii) of the Idaho Child Support 
Guidelines provides in relevant part: 
Compensation received by a party for employment in excess of a 
40 hour week shall be excluded from gross income, provided the 
party demonstrates and the Court finds: (1) the excess employment 
is voluntary and not a condition of employment; and (2) the excess 
employment is in the nature of additional, part-time employment, 
or is employment compensable as overtime pay by the hour or 
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fractions of the hour, and (3) the party's compensation structure has 
not been changed for the purpose of affecting a support or 
maintenance obligation, and (4) the party is otherwise paid for full 
time employment at least 48 weeks per year, and (5) child support 
payments are calculated based upon current income .... 
Pedro met his burden to establish that his overtime income should not be included. First, 
Pedro testified that overtime is voluntary and not a condition of employment. only other 
v.ritness to address issue was Jose Hernandez who was called by Bertha to about 
Pedro's alleged infidelity. Mr. Hernandez u.=',-,,",,-, that overtime was voluntary except during 
harvest time which lasts about two months. Mag. p. 50 (179: 1-5). So Bertha's witness, 
Mr. Hernandez, is believed over time is only mandatory during harvest and Bertha did not rebut 
any of this evidence. The Trial Court's reasoning its ruling was: 
Logic and reason indicate that farm work by nature has mandatory 
overtime during planting irrigation (cultivation) and harvest 
season. With a presumption in favor of income inclusion, and the 
burden on the parent to "demonstrate" voluntariness and lack of 
condition of employment as to overtime income, in this court's 
view setting Pedro's income at his base annual rate would defY the 
evidence and reason. Memorandum Decision p. 4. 
Pedro works for General Mills at a grain elevator as a maintenance man. Thus, the Trial 
Court's characterization of Pedro's job as farm work is blatantly incorrect. Pedro does not 
irrigate, cultivate or harvest crops. Furthermore, harvest time at General Mills means grain 
harvest during late summer and not potatoes and sugar beets which are harvested in falL With 
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that evidence Pedro certainly met his burden of showing that at least as to ten months of the year, 
overtime is voluntary. 
Second, there is no dispute that Pedro was paid by the hour so 
"compensable as overtime pay by the hour or fractions of the hour." 
employment is 
Third, Pedro's compensation structure was not been changed for the purpose affecting 
his support obligation. The Court found that "Pedro has averaged approximately $49,000 per 
year working the same job and working approximately same schedule." Clerk's Record p. 73. 
Thus, nothing about Pedro's compensation had changed to affect his support obligation. 
Fourth, there is no dispute that Pedro is "otherwise paid for fun time employment at least 
48 weeks per year." 
Fifth, child support was calculated on Pedro's current income and should be recalculated 
based on his regular time, plus any mandatory overtime if the Court finds there is mandatory 
overtime. Pedro testified that during harvest they work 20 to 25 hours of overtime per week and 
this is consistent with Mr. Hernandez who testified that they worked 4 to 5 hours of overtime 
each day during harvest. Pedro's hourly rate at the time of trial was $16.23. Time and one-half of 
that amount would be $24.35 per hour. Two months, or eight weeks, of working 22 Y2 hours of 
overtime each week amounts to $4,383 of over time. Thus, if the Court is inclined to believe Mr. 
Hernandez, then Pedro's income for child support purposes would be $39,383. 
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Finally, the Trial Court stated as follows at the hearing on Pedro's Motion for New Trial 
and/or Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement: 
So my recollection is, Scott -- and you can 
correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't his W -2 earnings 
typically closer to fifty-five, sixty thousand. 
MR. AXLINE: It was something over fifty ifI 
465 
recall correct. 
THE COURT: Yeah. They were -- this, this was 
a lower number than his, than his W-2 income for, for 
a significant period. 
So I, I sort of adjusted it downward from 
average earnings taking, taking into consideration 
that, you know, he -- some of that was certainly 
voluntary, but he had -- a good chunk of that was 
voluntary as welL 
So I, I wanted to give him some credit that 
because the presumption is for inclusion, not for 
excluding income. But I wanted to give him some, 
some credit for the, the fact that he'd worked hard 
and he shouldn't be penalized for those, those 
extra hours to a certain extent. 
Mag. Tran. p. 121-122 (464:22-p. 465:1-15). 
Based on the Trial Court's impression ofthe evidence a "good chunk" of Pedro's income 
was voluntary overtime so according to the Trial Court it adjusted Pedro's child support income 
downward. The actual evidence at trial showed that Pedro averaged $49,860 from 2007-2009. 
Exhibits VV, WW and XX. Trial Exhibits p. 137, 152 and 173. Pedro actually made his best 
money in 2008 when he made $50,980 and he made only $49,403 in 2009. Since the trial was 
held in early 2010 it was too soon to know what Pedro's 2010 income would be. Thus, Pedro 
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proved to the Trial Court's satisfaction that a "good chunk" of his over time was voluntary and 
the Trial Court intended to adjust Pedro's child support income accordingly. The problem is that 
the Trial Court simply did not follow through on its obligation to render a decision consistent 
with the evidence. 
The evidence clearly demonstrated that all overtime was voluntary except possibly tvvo 
months during harvest. The Trial Court believed that a "good chunk" overtime was 
voluntary. There is no other reasonable conclusion supported by substantial competent evidence. 
Thus, this Appellate Court should order that Pedro's income be set at $35,000 or $39,383 for 
child support purposes, or remand to the Trial Court to correct this error. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES TO BERTHA. 
The Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Bertha. Trial Court 
held that a disparity in income is generally sufficient to support a finding that higher income 
spouse pay attorney fees for the lower income spouse. The Trial Court cited Jensen v. Jensen, 
128 Idaho 600, 606, 917 P.2d 757 (1996), for this proposition, but Jensen does not stand for that 
proposition. Rather, Jensen stands for the proposition that awarding attorney fees is not 
appropriate if the lower income spouse has the resources to prosecute or defend the action. 
Jensen cited Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 960, 855 P.2d 40 (1993), for this proposition. In 
light ofthe property, child support and spousal maintenance awarded to Bertha, she is not also 
entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
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Additionally, the Trial Court erred in not making specific findings under I.C § 32-704(3) 
and § 32-705 that the factors in § 32-705 have been properly considered. See Jones v. Jones, 117 
Idaho 621,626, 790 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1990)(indicating that a court must make findings regarding 
the factors set forth in § 32-705 before making an award of attorney fees); Rohr v. Rohr, 128 
Idaho 137, 143,911 P.2d 133 (1996)(holding that in order for appellate court to uphold award of 
attorney fees, the lower court must have considered and cited factors listed in I.C § 32-705). 
Therefore, the award attorney fees to Bertha should be vacated. 
D. PEDRO IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
As set forth herein the Trial Court made many obvious and prejudicial errors of fact and 
law. Thus, Bertha cannot defend the Trial Court's rulings which culminate in the Decree of 
Divorce without defending the same in a frivolous and unreasonable manner. Thus, Pedro should 
be awarded attorney fees for having to bring this appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should adjust Pedro's child support and spousal 
maintenance obligations consistent with the evidence and the law. Alternatively, this Court 
should remand to the Trial Court with instructions to modifY the child support and spousal 
maintenance consistent with the law and the evidence. 
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